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ABSTRACT
Cross-border bankruptcy continues to be an important topic within bankruptcy regimes
worldwide. As more corporations find themselves interacting in a market without the confines of
geographic borders, countries need to adapt their regulatory schemes to be able to properly
handle an orderly liquidation or reorganization without an adverse impact on the economy. This
paper discuses the challenges of a cross-border bankruptcy regime that would be effective and
proposes a cooperative solution for increasing coordination among insolvency proceedings. As a
result of increasing cooperation among jurisdiction in light of the recent and ongoing financial
crisis, reform within the bankruptcy regimes around the world is foreseeable.
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Global Consumer Products Inc., “GCP,” 2 has operations in the United States, Germany,
Brazil, India and China. Suppliers and creditors are spread globally in Australia, Russia, Japan,
and the United Kingdom. GCP’s customers rely on selling GCP products on the customer’s store
shelves across the globe. This corporation employs hundreds of thousands of employees, many
whose retirement depends on their stock options. GCP is a mega-corporation, a company that
personifies the growing trend of globalization. The collapse of GCP would be catastrophic to the
world’s economy. What jurisdiction would be best equipped to represent this globally diverse
group of creditors? Better yet, what jurisdiction would be able to manage an effective
reorganization that would satisfy creditors but still protect an employee’s retirement?
Corporations like GCP highlight the challenges of cross-border insolvency proceedings and the
need for reform in current practices.
Views and approaches on bankruptcy have evolved over the years as the world faces an
increasingly globalized market where the effects of an entity, like GCP, entering insolvency
travels beyond geographic borders. Currently, international bankruptcy is a “complex area of the
law, which is ‘underdeveloped and inconsistent at best.’” 3 Recently, there has been an increase
in cross-border insolvency cases. 4 With the globalization of trade and “increasing international
nature of business,” it is natural to see a “similar increase in the number of business failures, and
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hence also with the number of cross-border insolvency cases.” 5 Although there is still a diverse
collection of bankruptcy regimes operating in the world today, countries are responding to the
globalization trend and working toward collaboration and harmonization within bankruptcy
systems. 6 This history of collaboration is only likely to increase as countries continue to respond
to the recent financial crisis and work together to address concerns about businesses whose
failures can be so deeply entangled in our global marketplace and how insolvency regimes can
be aligned. 7
I.

Approaches to Insolvency Regimes
Most legal systems “provide a legal mechanism to address the collective satisfaction of

the outstanding claims from assets” (whether intangible or tangible) of the debtor if the debtor is
“unable to pay its debts and other liabilities as they become due.” 8 There are a number of
mechanisms for resolving a debtor’s financial difficulties: voluntary restructuring negotiations, 9
insolvency proceedings, 10 and administrative processes. 11 Insolvency proceedings can result in
5
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either reorganization or liquidation. 12 Although the days of debtor’s prison and torturing a debtor
are behind us with only few exceptions, 13 insolvency regimes still differ from country to country.
If GCP, for example, found itself facing insolvency across its global operations, it would face a
variety of, and at times conflicting, insolvency regimes. 14 Further, if GCP wanted to reorganize,
the laws of some jurisdictions in which they operate may not be favorable toward
reorganization. 15 Beyond differing philosophies on the goals of insolvency, a “dizzying array” of
differences and disagreements exist between jurisdictions with respect to procedures and rules
within a bankruptcy case, from the way creditors are required to file and substantiate a claim to
avoidance of pre-insolvency transactions creating a hectic insolvency proceeding for GCP. 16
These differences as discussed below can have an impact ranging from a minor inefficiency or
individual inconvenience to producing vastly different outcomes for certain creditors depending
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on how a jurisdiction’s rules apply to their claim. 17 With GCP operating in so many jurisdictions
that apply different rules to creditors, it could increase their overall cost of doing business if
creditors require more security to protect themselves if GCP were to dissolve in a jurisdiction
unfavorable to that creditor.
Broadly speaking, while insolvency regimes and doctrines can differ in both their
philosophies and effects on a jurisdiction of the other, 18 insolvency regimes are generally divided
into two categories: territoriality and universality. 19 Since neither “pure universalism nor pure
territorialism” is practical, however, hybrid systems have emerged to create “modified
universalism” and “cooperative territorialism.” 20 Each type of insolvency regime has benefits
and drawbacks in approaching and managing a cross-border insolvency.
A.

Territoriality

If GCP became insolvent in a territoriality insolvency regime, 21 it would file a case in
each separate country, and each country would consider the proceeding its own main case. 22 The
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territoriality regime is best described as the “Grab Rule,” a concept built on the ground that
“local creditors had legitimate expectations that any financial crisis would be resolved applying
local policies and principles.” 23 A core principle of this approach to insolvency demonstrates the
belief that “insolvency laws do not, of themselves, have an extraterritorial reach, dealing as they
must with the application of a given country’s rules to a collection of property within the
jurisdictional reach of that country.” 24
The benefit of a territoriality regime is that in some situations, resolution is more cost
effective in protecting local creditors’ rights. Local creditors can set realistic expectations for
resolution of the case, since “property is administered and distributed in each bankruptcy case
according to the local law in which [the] property resides.” 25 Conversely, the effects of the
bankruptcy proceeding are limited to property that is located within that jurisdiction. 26 The
limitation of jurisdiction may work to the benefit of the debtor at the detriment of the creditor, if
the debtor maintained a bulk of their assets in a jurisdiction different from where it incurred most
of its debt, and therefore, creditors cannot reach those assets. 27 To counteract this problem, when

be softened by the U.S. influence. Peng Xu (Hosei University and RIETI), Bankruptcy
Resolution in Japan: Civil Rehabilitation vs. Corporate Reorganization, RIETI Discussion Paper
Series 04-E-010 (February 2004) <
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/04020008.html>
22
This type of doctrine, therefore, leaves open the possibility that there could be a “plurality of
proceedings” with the “exact number and jurisdictional location to be determined by the
circumstances” in the case. For more information on the territoriality insolvency regime See
Clark, supra note 7, at 517.
23
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors: Tex, Cases
and Problems 841 (6th ed. 2009).
24
See Clark, supra note 7, at 518.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Parents sometimes use subsidiaries as banks of last resort for restructurings and as a result
shuffle around assets that could later hurt the creditor’s rights to these assets during an
6

local creditors make a decision to contract with a debtor, they can protect themselves by relying
only on the security provided by local assets. 28
A territorialism approach was unchallenged until just relatively recently when “business
began commonly to break past the constraints of national boundaries to establish both asset bases
and networks of creditors and claims that span many sovereign territories.” 29 This unsatisfactory
resolution regime for transnational companies has been partly addressed by alternative theories
within territoriality, e.g. the theory of “cooperative territorialism” proposed by Professor
LoPucki with principals of cooperation and mutual administration. 30
B.

Universality

If GCP filed an insolvency case in a jurisdiction with a universality insolvency regime, it
would face a very different result. Universality regimes focus on the fact that bankruptcy is a
collective proceeding that “must extend to all the debtor’s assets and stakeholders” and a

insolvency proceeding whose jurisdiction is limited. Jacquie McNish, It’s the law of the jungle
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resolution must therefore be “symmetric to a debtor’s market.” 31 The focal point of this holistic
approach is that “for every debtor there should be a unified process of administration with all
claims and interest channeled through one main proceeding.” 32 In a case brought under a
universality doctrine in the debtor’s domicile country, all of the debtor’s property, regardless of
its location, is brought to the home jurisdiction for resolution and creditors must bring their
claims in that jurisdiction. 33 If GCP’s home jurisdiction for purposes of insolvency was
considered the United States, for example, all of the corporation’s property, whether in India,
China, or elsewhere, theoretically, would be brought into the United States’ jurisdiction for claim
resolution purposes. Universality can sometimes be compared to ordinary bankruptcy proceeding
found in the United States, and is considered to be more in “conformity with the very nature of
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings” 34 in addition to more economical, faster and more
efficient. 35
But while a universality regime has the benefit of a belief that “expects that the effects –
on both the property and the interests of the debtor – will be worldwide,” there are a number of
drawbacks. 36 Even though universality provides a system that should eliminate “discussion
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concerning the issue of which asset should go in which national territorial bankruptcy,” there are
still contested issues with the location of intangible assets and whether the jurisdiction in which
the asset is located is willing to give up local law application to the distribution of that asset.37
Recognizing these drawbacks, an alternative theory of modified universality has developed and
is considered the best balance between pure universality and territoriality regimes. 38
Since pure universality is unrealistic, 39 “modified universality begins with the idea of
pure universalism and then moves toward the center of the spectrum by incorporating certain
territorialism tendencies.” 40 This type of doctrine tries to address the problem of a debtor that
could easily choose a forum based on the laws that will be applied, or engaging in “forum
shopping.” 41 If GCP, for example, went to file its insolvency case, it might select a forum that

better addressed in the jurisdiction of their physical location. Finally, there can be a challenge in
funneling the assets of an entity into a home country’s jurisdiction and control if there is a not a
treaty or agreement in place that would increase the likelihood that a country would let property
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Clark, supra note 7, 517-518.
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had more protections for debtors at the expense of creditor’s rights. 42 At a theoretical level,
scholars would argue that a universal system, even modified universality, is far superior to
territorialism because the approach is “market symmetrical” and a global market requires a
global bankruptcy law that is “a single proceeding that can apply rules and reach results that are
conclusive with respect to all stakeholders through the global market.” 43
In a modified universalism system, typically, the lead court in administering the case is
the company’s ‘home country.’ This location is determined by the “center of its main interest” or
“COMI.” 44 For example, if an insolvent corporation’s “home country” is the United States, U.S.
courts would assert worldwide jurisdiction over the assets of the U.S. bankrupt. 45 With the
choice of forum addressed, the question of choice of law can often be a distinct issue, although
related to which country is the “home country.” In any cross-border bankruptcy case, the court
will be required to choose which bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law to apply. With this
knowledge in hand, debtors can be incentivized to file in a country that favors the debtor’s needs,
or avoid a “priority that would otherwise be enjoyed by a particular creditor constituency in
another country where some assets or operations were located.” 46 Therefore, these choices in a
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universalism system can be determinative of the resolution of the insolvency case for a
multinational corporation.
This concern is partially addressed by modified universality 47 because it recognizes the
downside of a system where a “debtor can easily choose a substantive law that will govern their
insolvency and that is contrary to the expectations and interests of creditors.” 48 This theory has
emerged as the dominant theory of insolvency regime. However, some of the benefit of a
universalist system where assets and claims are consolidated is lost within the modified
universalism regime. Modified universality allows an ancillary court to “retain their right to
protect local creditors,” therefore, losing some of the predictability of knowing in advance the
debtor’s home country and laws that will be applied. 49 Many of the more modern bankruptcy
regimes are reforming to align to a modified universality structure. Despite differences in
insolvency regimes around the world, there is a history of cooperation between jurisdictions for
the purposes of managing cross-border insolvency cases and the reorganization or liquidation of
multinational businesses.
II.

History of Cooperation
To address the growing number of cross-border insolvencies, practitioners, judges, and

legislators have “crafted[ed] gap-filling solutions to bring order to the chaos of uncoordinated
cross-border insolvency cases” with creativity and dedication.
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Some countries have

successfully reached agreements to cooperate in cross-border insolvency cases, at least
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regionally if not globally. 51 The importance of harmonized insolvency legislation is that it
provides a “higher degree of certainty and reciprocity for the players.” 52 Jurisdictions recognize
that there is value and efficiency in an insolvency proceeding in mainly one jurisdiction, where
one court primarily, although not necessarily exclusively, can control the assets of the
restructuring and coordinate the treatment of creditors. 53 However, historically, many of these
efforts at cross-border cooperation were either very regionalized or did not achieve widespread
adoption.
A.

Treaties

One of the first efforts that countries used to establish cooperative efforts for insolvency
proceedings that spanned geographic borders was the use of treaties. Treaties have the advantage
of being the “local law” in “all jurisdictions in which the treaty is adopted.” 54 While the power of
a treaty can be helpful, it can also be quite limited if the number of signatories to the treaty is
small since the treaty is only effective in the countries that have signed it. As a result, using
treaties proved to be an unsuccessful method for coordinating insolvency proceedings across
several countries.
B.

Comity

Comity is used by countries to recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings. Both Canada
and the United States have used this principle to recognize proceedings of companies that are
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There have been formal bankruptcies treaties and attempts at formal bankruptcy treaties dating
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highly interconnected between the two neighbors. Under Comity, “the extent that the United
States and foreign bankruptcy laws are inconsistent is important in determination of whether a
foreign court’s decrees should be enforced in the United States.” 55 U.S. courts deferred to the
laws and judicial acts of the United Kingdom in Maxwell Communication, after determining that
the “basic notions of due process and fair treatment of U.S. creditors were present.” 56 The U.S.
Supreme Court had the opportunity to address Comity in Hilton v. Guyot and defined Comity as
“the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under protection of its laws.” 57
Canada also used principles of Comity to recognize proceedings that spanned the United StatesCanadian border, because of their frequent economic interaction.
Comity was later codified in U.S. law. Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was
designed to “only permit the opening of an ancillary case” and did not address the coordination
55
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56
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57
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of “full-blown proceedings pending both in the United States and another country” and was a
“dramatic turn away from a history of territorialism.” 58 Case law developed under this section is
still relevant, but the section was later repealed by the passage of the new chapter 15 in 2005. 59
C.

EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings

Although, the European Union’s member states have been “striving for harmony in the
area of bankruptcy law for more than forty years”

60

with little success, real progress was made

when the European Union developed its most widely adopted pan-European rules governing
insolvency proceedings. The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (the
“Insolvency Convention”) was passed on September 25, 1995, 61 with final adoption on May 29,
2000. 62 In order to promote the free flow of commerce and creation of a single market within the
European Economic Community, the leaders recognized the need to deal with insolvency and
bankruptcy. 63 The agreement incorporated a number of elements of a modified universality
approach, as discussed above. The Explanatory Report to the Insolvency Convention read:
[The] Convention seeks to reconcile the principle of universality
and the protection of local interest and also the principles of the
respective legal systems…permits local proceedings governed by
their own lex fori concurus (law applicable in the place of
insolvency) to coexist with the main universal proceeding. Single
universal proceedings are always possible within the EC, but the
Convention does not exclude the opening of local proceedings,

58
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controlled and governed by its rules, to protect those local
interests. 64
More recently, in 2007, the European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for CrossBorder Insolvency (the “Insolvency Guidelines”) were published.

65

The Insolvency Guidelines

are helpful for understanding some of the cumbersome procedures found in the Insolvency
Convention. 66 The document highlights the role of a practitioner in insuring that coordination
between proceedings take place through a duty to communicate information and cooperate. 67
Although the Insolvency Guidelines are not binding, they assist in setting standards for
knowledge and professional behavior that are key to achieving the goals of the EC Insolvency
Regulation.

68

The purpose of the Insolvency Guidelines was to introduce rules for “dealing with

insolvencies with a cross-border element,” but its effectiveness in practice has been hampered by
the Regulation’s restrictions on application to qualified proceedings. 69 However, even with
procedures in place for managing insolvencies within the European Union’s borders, there are
still challenges for forum shopping and companies jockeying among jurisdictions to file in the
most favorable for their needs and purposes.
64
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D.

Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat

In the spring of 1996, the International Bar Association approved the “Cross-Border
Insolvency Concordat.” 70 The Concordat acted as an interim step until “treaties and/or statutes
were adopted by commercial nations,” and set forth ten general principles. The Concordat, like
the Insolvency Proceedings, employed a modified universality theory and was designed to assist
courts and counsels in “harmonizing cross-border insolvencies.” The passage of the Concordat
signaled recognition of the difficulty, given strong national interests, in the “preservation of
sovereignty and the absence of treaties in creating truly unified proceedings.” The structure of
the Concordat resulted in a “central administrative forum located in one country, supplemented
by ancillary, or secondary, proceedings located in other countries.” Cases resolved with the help
of the Concordat include In Re Everfresh Beverages 71 and In Re Joseph Nakash. 72
E.

ALI Transnational Insolvency Project

70

Nielson, Anne, Mike Sigal and Karen Wagner. International Law Symposium: Article: The
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilities the Resolution of International
Insolvencies. 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 533 (Fall 1996).
71
The case of In Re Everfresh Beverages involved a bankrupt U.S. corporation with operations
in both the US and Canada that filed proceedings in both the US and Canada. During the
proceedings, both the Ontario Court of Justice and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York issued orders approving a stipulation of cross-border insolvency
protocol to govern the bankrupt’s provision. The stipulation was consistent with – and almost
identical to – many of the provisions of the Concordat. Perry, supra note 3, at 486.
72
In Nakash, the debtor had diversified business interests throughout the world….[and] filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and
managed his affairs as debtor and debtor-in-possession. The defendant was a member of the
board of directors of the North American Bank, Ltd. (NAB), an Israeli banking institution which
was declared insolvent and a Receiver was appointed. The case concerned jurisdiction and the
extraterritoriality application of an automatic stay – with the court holding that participation in
the U.S. Chapter 11 case gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction and found the actions of the
Israeli Receiver a violation of the automatic stay. See In re Joseph Nakash v. Schmuel Zur, 190
B.R. 763 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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The Insolvency Convention set the stage for further regional cooperation. The ALI
Transnational Insolvency Project (the “ALI Project”) was developed in 2001 by the American
Law Institute. 73 The ALI Project set out to propose “more specific procedures by which such
cooperation – especially coordination of parallel proceedings – might be effectuated.” 74 The ALI
principles were established based on the “perceived need for a private-sector initiative.” The
objective of the ALI Project was limited to developing “cooperative procedures for use in
business insolvency cases involving companies with assets or creditors in more than one of the
three NAFTA countries.” 75 The proposed principles of cooperation include seventeen guidelines
that were developed from the lessons learned during more than a dozen cross-border cases where
courts aligned their approaches, communication, supervision and completion of a cross-border
insolvency case. 76 The project took an interesting approach to develop procedures by first taking
the time to get to “know each other’s laws” to report on their findings to all of the stakeholders
and use that knowledge to be able to know how to coordinate those proceedings. 77 Adoption of
amended national bankruptcy regimes supports the implementation of the principles proposed to
increase commercial predictability within the NAFTA region. 78
F.

Other Regional Efforts

The importance of, if nothing more, regional collaboration or coordination is best
illustrated by the result when coordination is absent. When the conglomerate Asia Pulp and
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Paper (AP&P) collapsed in 2001, there were no regional cross-border insolvency laws in place at
the time.

79

As a result, the company fell with debts of $13.9 billion and its creditors were left

with no alternative but a “hard fought informal restructuring of the group.” 80 Responding to the
chaotic restructuring, the Asian Development Bank launched a program focused on insolvency
law reform in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. 81 In addition to regional
arrangements now in existence in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Northern Europe and Central
Africa have structures in place for some form of cooperation. 82
G.

UNCITRAL

The most successful example to date of widespread cooperation of local courts
interacting and cooperating within international insolvency cases is the UN Commission on
International Trade Law Model Law adopted in 1997. 83 The law was introduced to try to address
some of the gaps left behind by regionalized agreements.

84

Commonly referred to as

“UNCITRAL Model Law” or just “Model Law,” 85 it is the basis for a number of local laws
concerning cross-border bankruptcy, including Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 86 The
law was formulated to deal with the “rapidly expanding volume of international insolvency
79
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Mondaq Ltd., October 9, 2007.
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cases.” 87 The law is an endorsement of cooperation among courts, and encourages such
cooperation by any means permitted within local law. 88 To date, the Model Law has been
enacted in 18 nations or territories, still far short of widespread adoption. 89 The Model Law does
not “envisage a full-scale harmonization of national insolvency laws” but “comes in addition to
the substantive insolvency laws of the states that will implement it and it aims to deal with the
special difficulties that are associated with a number of cross-border insolvency situations.” 90
Other treaties and agreements in existence between countries still provide the basis for most
cooperative efforts within a cross-border bankruptcy case. The Model Law, while providing the
basis for domestic laws, addresses some important issues in international insolvency only
indirectly and leaves unanswered questions on choice of law. 91 Without the weight of
widespread adoption, the Model Law still lacks credibility in many jurisdictions.
H.

Notable Cases

The importance of attempting to mitigate the conflicts in national insolvency regimes
when resolving a company with international corporate structure was learned through the
complicated resolution of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”). BCCI,
founded in 1972 in Luxembourg, had more than 400 offices in 69 countries and collapsed after
years of investigation revealed in 1991 that financial statements have been falsified since the
bank’s founding. 92 The challenges identified that complicated the liquidation of BCCI’s assets
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and reduced the amount that could be distributed to creditors included differing insolvency
regimes for banks and branches 93, different liquidation procedures 94, the right of set-off differing
across regimes 95 , and the potential for criminal charges to be brought to prevent fraud in
bankruptcy proceedings. 96 The two approaches to insolvency regimes have different implications
for market discipline, and may “undermine incentives for creditors with international operations
to seek to do transactions in well-supervised jurisdictions.” 97 With a lack of agreement on an
international insolvency regime, uninsured creditors of BCCI incurred substantial legal expenses
and a long wait for settlement of their claims. 98
I.

Case-Level Protocols

Sometimes coordination can be achieved through case specific agreements for those
cross-border bankruptcy cases that involve a particularly large pool of creditors spread across
Corporate Structure 5 (paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on
Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies, September 30-October 1)
93
For example, the US follows a “separate-entity doctrine in which the agency or branch of a
foreign bank is treated as if [it] were a separately incorporated legal entity for purposes of
liquidation” and some countries, like Luxembourg and the UK follow a “single-entity doctrine.”
In this doctrine, “foreign branches are treated as offices of a single corporate entity.” Herring,
supra note 92, at 11.
94
In the US, bankruptcy law does not apply to banks. Instead, the “primary bank supervisor
would liquidate the branch of a foreign bank.” Conversely, some foreign courts apply to the
same liquidation laws to banks as to other commercial entities, or decide on a case-by-case basis.
Herring, supra note 92, at 13.
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Set off is defined as “a nonjudicial process whereby mutual claims between parties, such as a
loan or deposit, are extinguished.” The Basel Committee (1992b, p.3).
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In jurisdictions where criminal charges can be levied against a bank, even when it has entered
insolvency (like in the US), these ancillary charges could actually work to “override ex ante
repayment priorities and reduce the amounts available for distribution to creditors.” Herring,
supra note 92, at 15; Some of these challenges are unique to bank insolvency proceedings and do
not apply to corporate entities in bankruptcy.
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See generally Herring, supra note 92.
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multiple jurisdictions. In re Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., jurisdictions involved in the
resolution of the company developed a cross-border insolvency protocol that supported the
coordination of foreign proceedings. 99 Under the protocol, “the administrators and trustees
would have a streamlined method for administering intercompany claims, including the creation
of a committee to discuss methods to resolve those claims” and create a framework to minimize
the cost and maximize the recoveries to Lehman’s creditors. 100 The document lists seven goals,
including coordination, communication, information and data sharing, asset preservation, claims
reconciliation, the maximization of recoveries, and Comity. 101 Administrators and trustees in
Germany, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Netherlands and the United States have signed the
Lehman Protocol. 102 Case-level protocols are not without complications, as a case-level protocol
does not “address the inherent complexities caused by state’s differing insolvency and private
international laws” and can therefore be difficult to enforce. 103 A case-level protocol is seen as more
of an economic solution than a legal approach, and fails to provide the predictability that would help
stabilize the market and decrease risk when initially contracting with a debtor. 104

III.

Challenges to Cooperation

99

Leigh Kamping-Carder, Court OKs Global Lehman Protocol, Law 360,
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payment. Additionally, the agreement provides a mechanism for administrators to adjust
distributions so that, in certain instances, creditors that have received payment for a claim in one
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Despite movements to create more harmonized insolvency proceedings, many barriers
still exist to full cooperation of jurisdictions in managing cross-border bankruptcy cases. Cultural
and legal differences between jurisdictions can create friction in the coordination of resolution
efforts. Even if jurisdictions are able to agree on deferring to a primary foreign proceeding,
procedural challenges do not end there.
If the agreement is to place a primary insolvency proceeding in the company’s “Center of
Main Interests,” how does a jurisdiction determine the “COMI”? This can be a contentious point
in an insolvency proceeding even with existing cross-border cooperation agreements in place. 105
For example, GCP has operations in the United States, Germany, Brazil, India and China. If its
executives and management responsibilities are spread evenly among those jurisdictions, how
could the COMI be determined satisfactorily? In the United States, a main proceeding is defined
by “a case pending in whatever country contains the debtor’s ‘center of main interests.’” 106 In
order to interpret this statutory definition, the courts in the United States are expressly directed to
look for guidance in the “interpretation of COMI by foreign jurisdictions under similar
statutes.” 107 The EU Insolvency Convention defines “COMI” as the “place where the debtor
conducts administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third
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parties.” 108 Courts in the United States have adopted the EU Convention standard of looking to
objective and ascertainable factors to rebut the presumption that the jurisdiction of the registered
office is the COMI of a debtor. 109 Despite agreement between the European Union and the
United States on the determination of COMI, this remains a vague definition when applied to a
corporation that is truly global in its operations, like GCP. Further, although there is
harmonization between the United States and the European Union in defining “COMI,” a critical
term, for purposes of recognizing proceedings, other definitions and tests exist. A debtor that has
assets and conducts business in more than one country could find itself “satisfying the
requirements to be subject to the insolvency laws of more than one State because of the different
tests of debtor eligibility or different interpretations of the same test.” 110 Countries may be
unwilling to coordinate with another foreign proceeding if procedures and due process are not
compatible.
Cultural attitudes also play a large role in the effectiveness of a national bankruptcy
system, including approaches to debt forgiveness and the “way people stand in life
(philosophically the United States’ approach is that every debtor is a potential entrepreneur).”111
Different cultures hold different legal beliefs and values, and those values shape a domestic
insolvency regime, including how it treats debtors, as mentioned earlier, debtor’s prisons still
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exist in some parts of the world. Further, a bankruptcy regime does not live in isolation, but is
under the “influence of a particular nation’s overall legal system, where case law or code
based 112 and the economic and financial structure of the domestic market. There exists a “close
relationship between economic results and legal solutions” and insolvency law “underpins the
commercial and financial dealings in the market economy” and the “choices it makes are a
crucial indicator of the attitudes and fundamental values of the state’s legal system.” 113 There is a
strong probability that a government will seek an insolvency regime that protects local creditors
and stakeholders. This is not a surprising result, because the government “faces public and policy
pressure to allocate financial resources in a way that reduces the burden for its own
taxpayers.” 114
With all of these different factors affecting a country’s national bankruptcy system, there
is the opportunity for great friction between two nation’s insolvency regimes. 115 Any friction
between the two countries in their cooperative efforts could be further burdened by the political
overlay. 116 These interacting factors can make it challenging for two countries to agree to
112
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Aside from political tensions, differences between two jurisdictions can also present
challenges when sharing information or transferring assets. For instance, China has very strong
“state secrets” law and may block the exchange of some information if it has deemed that
information to qualify as a “state secret,” a definition that is inherently broad. The potential “that
economic and business data may be considered state secrets according to such sweeping
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collaborate on the resolution of an insolvency proceeding when their national systems exist in
such different contexts. Cross-border insolvencies therefore “thrust these systems into sometimes
uneasy partnerships,” forcing them to choose between “finding some means of cooperation and
compromise or watching the destruction of viable enterprises and asset value.” 117 Even if the
tension between two jurisdictions can be managed, case-level challenges still exist.
Even with agreements in place, a lack of case-level coordination can be crippling to the
successful resolution of a cross-border bankruptcy case. The liquidation of Allen Standford’s
banks faced conflicting rulings from Canadian and English Courts based on differing rulings on
the determination of the Foreign Main Proceeding (the United States and Antigua,
respectively). 118 In addition to struggles between Canada and England, “the Antiguan liquidators
and the United States receivership were gearing up for fights over assets situated in other
locations, such as Switzerland.”
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The lack of cooperation between jurisdictions demonstrates

some of the challenges still faced in developing effective coordination efforts in the resolution of
cross-border insolvency case even if over-arching agreements for cooperation are in existence.
IV.

Future of Cooperation

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm, last viewed on December 15, 2011. Even more
recently the tensions between Iran have escalated, resulting in both the U.S. and E.U. announcing
coordinating sanctions. These are political contexts and complications that can plague any
coordination efforts between two jurisdictions. To read more about recent developments in IranWestern relations, see Iran, Country and Territory Reports, The New York Times, Updated
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We are now entering into a time of historical levels of cooperation and information
sharing. 120 With widespread financial reform occurring around the world in response to the
financial crisis in 2008-2009, changes in national bankruptcy systems could be a natural and
necessary side effect. Often a prerequisite for “effective economic integration” between countries
is a uniformity of bankruptcy laws, a concept recognized in the United States since the drafting
of The Federalist Papers. 121 As national systems are amending to adapt to growing globalization,
some territorialist approaches could be relaxed amidst reform efforts for more cooperative
measures that would promote effective and efficient resolution of cross-border insolvency cases
for multinational corporations. While the task of a “formalized mutual administration” that is
“attentive to the distinct interests of the effective administration of foreign-located assets and the
maintenance of state sovereignty” that are at odds in cross-border insolvency may be daunting,
there are signs of progress in the international conversation. 122
Experts contend that the financial crisis that rippled through the world in 2008-2009 was
the worst shock to the global economy since the 1930’s. 123 World leaders came together to
stabilize the global economy and met in 2009 at the UN Conference on the World Financial and
Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development to identify responses, both emergency and long
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term. 124 As a result of increased communication and cooperation, global leaders, through the
efforts and voice of the G-20, 125 have promoted an effort to coordinate global policy.
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“The international system, as constructed following the Second
World War, will be almost unrecognizable in 2025. Indeed,
international system is a misnomer. It is likely to be more
ramshackle than orderly, its composition hybrid and
heterogeneous, as befits a transition that will still be a work in
progress…the Transformation is being fuelled by a globalizing
economy, marked by an historic shift of relative wealth and
economic power from West to East, and by the increasing weight
of new players especially China and India.” 127
Just recently, the G-20 again affirmed their commitment to advanced cooperative measures to
promote financial stability in the international marketplace and work together to make
“globalization serve the needs of our people.” 128 The increased dialogue is highlighted by the
growing number of venues for such transatlantic cooperation to develop. While there has been
cooperation among nations within criminal and human rights law, 129 international coordination is
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just now growing in international private law and its regulatory framework providing a basis for
a conversation in bankruptcy reform.
Other areas of growing global collaboration set the example for increased information
and resource sharing within the insolvency context. For example, foreign institutions have
measures in place to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of securities law violations.
“Because territory-based conflicts approaches parcel out regulatory authority along geographical
lines, it is evident that they are in many respects ill-suited to resolve conflicts in a world of crossborder activity.” 130 The International Organization of Securities Commissions Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding (“IOSCO MMOU”), developed in 2001 and endorsed by
IOSCO in 2005, 131 is the first global information-sharing arrangement among securities
regulators and sets a “new international benchmark for cross-border cooperation critical to
combating violations of securities and derivatives laws.” 132 The IOSCO MMOU, signed by
securities regulators from 80 countries with 34 members listed in the Annex B List, 133 recognizes
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the global nature of transactions and the necessity of countries working together to share
information and assist in investigations to protect investors from a crime that is rarely contained
within a single jurisdiction. The IOSCO MMOU increased interaction and cooperation between
foreign securities regulators. 134 Other initiatives have developed within jurisdictions to promote
collaboration in the financial markets, like the efforts of the Office of Financial Research in the
United States, established within the U.S. Treasury Department. 135 Although securities fraud
appears to be a more egregious crime than a creditor being denied their rights to a debtor’s assets
because of jurisdictional limitations, the injuries to a creditor can be just as severe to that of a
defrauded investor. 136 The fact that countries are willing to work together to protect an investor

Appendix B, IOSCO Library, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main (last
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Year
Requests
2003 56
2004 307
2005 384
2006 526
2007 726
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provides the groundwork for similar arrangements in sharing information and resources to
protect a creditor or debtor, regardless of the number of jurisdictions involved.
Some of the more fundamental conflicts between insolvency laws have seen some
resolution as states converge around the “rescue model.”

137

Although historically most

insolvency systems have approached insolvency with the end goal of liquidation, countries are
now “increasingly adopting and enhancing insolvency laws designed to facilitate reorganization
of faltering businesses rather than immediately resorting to liquidation.” 138 This shift is notable
when examining the goals of the Financial Stability Board (the “FSB”). The FSB brings together
national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial
centers, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators
and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts
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Established to “address

vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in
the interest of financial stability,” 140 the FSB is promoting a comprehensive policy framework
“comprising a new international standard for resolution regimes, more intensive and effective
supervision, and requirements for cross-border cooperation and recovery and resolution

137

See Wessels et. al., supra note 13, at 167.
Id. The “penetration of a new business rescue culture into nearly every corner of the globe is
vividly illustrated by developments in one of the most tradition-bound nations in the world.” For
a further discussion of insolvency reforms that converge arounda rescue model, see generally
Wessels et. al., 167-195.
139
Overview, About the FSB, Financial Stability Board,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last viewed November 22, 2011).
140
Financial Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ (last viewed November 22,
2011).
138

30

planning.” 141 A lot of this reform is in response to the designation of Global Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (“G-SIFIs”) or institutions “too big to fail.”
G-SIFIs are defined by the FSB as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly
failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.” 142 In order to address
policy considerations for the resolutions of these mega firms, the FSB is promoting legislative
changes that will be required in many jurisdictions to strengthen cooperation. 143 Both the United
States and European Union have already adopted new regulation or amended legislation that
addresses the resolution of these global institutions. New regulation to address the management
of an orderly resolution of failing companies that have a large presence in multiple jurisdictions
is arguably the strongest protection against another future public bailout. 144 In this regard, the
Dodd-Frank Act in the United States 145 creates an Orderly Liquidation Authority 146 for
systemically important firms and the European Union issued Directive on Credit Institutions
Reorganization and Winding-Up addresses the resolution of a bank systemically important to the
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European Union. 147 However, “without an agreed cross-border regime, both European and U.S.
companies will [still] be hard to unwind.” 148 Even with legislation in place to address
systemically important institutions, the legislation does not necessarily allow for coordination if
that institution has an equally strong and vital presence in both the United States and European
Union. The need for further cooperation in developing cross-border resolution regimes is
illustrated by the difficulties in resolving large and complex cross-border institutions. Those
resolutions reveal the need for significant transatlantic cooperation in order to ensure the
credibility and viability of cross-border bank and financial companies’ resolution regimes and
avoidance of bailouts. 149
Other organizations have also addressed providing a framework for the orderly resolution
of “cross-border failures of large complex banking organizations,” recognizing the necessity of
change. The Basel Committee’s 150 Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group has developed ten
recommendations 151 for national authorities, which “aim at greater convergence of national
resolution frameworks” and should “help strengthen cross-border crisis management” regarding
147
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these systemically important firms, particularly large banks or financial institutions. 152 In order
to adequately protect the global economy from the failure of these G-SIFIs or large financial
institutions, countries are being asked to amend their national regulation to allow for increase
global cooperativeness. Although reform has been primarily concerned with global financial
institutions, the disorderly failure of a multinational manufacturing company, like our
hypothetical GCP, could be just as problematic for maintaining stability in the global
marketplace. With hundreds of thousands of employees relying on GCP for income, and
suppliers and creditors relying on contracts with GCP, the collapse of GCP could have a rippling
effect throughout the world’s economies. Widespread cooperation concerning G-SIFIs can
provide the precedent for aligning diverse national bankruptcy systems and easing the historical
friction in coordinating transnational insolvency cases.
Attention to transatlantic reform within cross-border insolvencies continues to grow and a
number of other international institutions – notably the International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”)
and the World Bank – are interested in reform of bankruptcy laws, both domestic and
international. 153 The World Bank has asserted the important benefit to market economies of an
insolvency framework that is predictable:
The creation . . . of a framework [for an insolvency system], and its
integration within the wider context of the established legal
process, are vital to the maintenance of social order and stability in
the fullest sense: all parties in interest need to be in a position to
152
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anticipate their legal rights in the event of the debtor’s inability to
pay, or to pay in full, whatever is due to them in consequence of
their dealings and relationship. This in turn enables them to make
calculations regarding the economic implications of such default
by the debtor, and hence to estimate risk. 154
The IMF, in recognizing the world needs a new way of handling debt crisis, has entertained the
option of creating bankruptcy “procedures on the international level that are similar to those that
exist on the domestic level.” 155 In this regard, the IMF would limit itself to the debt crises faced
by countries in economic trouble, and would act as a sort of bankruptcy court. 156 While this
proposal has sparked renewed discussion in an international forum for resolving bankruptcy
disputes, the feasibility of this IMF proposal is challenged by limited resources and legal
barriers.
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Regardless, the IMF and World Bank play an important role in the convergence of

bankruptcy law by requiring bankruptcy reform in developing countries as a condition of loan
support. 158
Although there is increased transnational dialogue regarding broad financial reform and
coordinated regulation, reforming cross-border bankruptcy laws may be more difficult to address
because of the complexity of aligning differing national bankruptcy laws. Despite progress in
international cooperation in some regulatory matters, like foreign securities law, countries may
not see the benefit in changes in national bankruptcy systems that allow for cooperation. The
hope is that with increased dialogue and collaboration within some regulatory frameworks, the

154

World Bank, ‘Draft Background Paper: Building Effective Insolvency Systems: Towards
Principles and Guidelines’, Paper presented to the Conference on Insolvency Systems in Asia:
An Efficiency Perspective (1999, Sydney) at 1 as cited in Mason, supra note 21, at 34.
155
Ian Vaquez, The IMF as Bankruptcy Court for Countries?, CATO Institute, October 10, 2002.
156
See id.
157
See id.
158
See Buxbaum, supra note 130, at 946.
34

discussion for more coordination in transnational insolvency cases can be broached. The best
approach to cooperation may be through the insolvency protocol agreement on a case-level basis.
V.

A Cooperative Solution
A uniform global bankruptcy law, while entertained in academic discussions, is likely

unfeasible. For the reasons discussed earlier countries have unique cultural, legal and political
systems in which they operate and transact and those long standing histories evolve only slowly
and with corresponding baggage. In response to globalization, the best option for future
cooperation most likely exists on the case-level insolvency protocol agreements. However, the
case-level insolvency protocol needs to be supported by a strong over-arching international
agreement between jurisdictions that would provide consistent guidance and precedent to protect
debtors and creditors alike when transacting business. Predictability can be hard to come by in an
inherently chaotic system like insolvency and an advantage of having more universal rules could
be increased predictability and therefore, stability. 159
The problems of the case-by-case protocol, like that used in Lehman, stem from a lack of
authoritative weight to enforce the principles of the protocol. The international bankruptcy
regime could use an IOSCO-like agreement, as mentioned supra in IV, that would help bind
signatories to complying with case protocols for international insolvency proceedings, providing
a legal context for this previously economic solution. This type of Multilateral Memorandum Of
Understanding (“MMOU”) would require a considerable amount of groundwork as countries
would need to adapt their domestic laws to allow them to comply with an international
agreement. While revolution is well underway thanks to the UNICTRAL Model Law, further
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revision is necessary. The agreement would govern the development and implementation of a
protocol for a specific cross-border case and would provide better clarity and structure in
defining the players, and roles of jurisdictions involved. The Foreign Main Proceeding would be
an easier determination with an objective criteria for determination of the primary jurisdiction,
and through this agreement, countries would pledge to support the main proceeding by whatever
means necessary, within the limits of their domestic law.
Although a widespread cooperative arrangement for insolvency would not be without its
challenges, it could still be an important tool in managing cross-border bankruptcy cases. It is
still unlikely that all jurisdictions would sign on to an agreement like this because of the cultural,
political and legal differences between countries. Ideally, however, enough countries would sign
the agreement to make the principles of the agreement a standard practice in insolvency
proceedings around the world and carry some authoritative weight. Using GCP as an example, if
all the countries in which GCP had operations, suppliers and creditors were signatories to the
agreement, GCP would use the principles of the agreement to determine where the main
proceeding should be filed. The agreement could contain an objective formula for determining
the primary jurisdiction (that is, a calculation based on where a majority of operating costs are
incurred, or where a majority of credit is obtained). After the main proceeding was finalized, the
court in that primary jurisdiction would have the ability to request assistance, through the
agreement, from other jurisdictions to consolidate assets and claims in the primary jurisdiction.
The benefit of this solution for more streamlined cross-border insolvency proceedings, however,
would be compromised if one of the jurisdictions GCP had operations in, like Brazil, did not sign
the agreement and instead made a determination by its local laws that the main proceeding

36

should be in Brazil. Hopefully the relatively widespread adoption of the IOSCO MMOU would
bode well for similar adoption of an agreement in the insolvency context.
VI.

Conclusion
At the crossroads of insolvency law and private international law, remain critical issues

of predictability in business interactions that depends on transparency in applicable foreign
regulations. 160 As long as these issues remained unresolved by the current international
insolvency scheme, there will be uncertainty and potential instability in the global market place.
As a company like GCP highlights, most corporations interact in multiple jurisdictions and can
be so integral to some marketplaces, that a disorderly failure or collapse of the corporation could
be catastrophic to a local or even regional economy. Compounding to that inherent risk of failure
and the impact on the world economy, transactional costs also increase for globalized companies.
If creditors that are unsure as to how their claims would be resolved should GCP find itself
unable to pay or pay in full its liabilities, it may increase GCP’s cost of doing business (which
could ripple through to consumers). In any insolvency, whether contained in a single jurisdiction
or spanning multiple jurisdictions, the interests must be balanced among the debtor, the creditor,
and the legal environment or community in which they transact. Insolvency law is so “intimately
linked to the commercial, financial and social fabric of a state that finding this balance is
inherently challenging. 161 With an agreement in place that establishes the guidelines for
jurisdictions interacting and managing a multi-jurisdiction resolution, this balance could be met.
As long as the economies of the world continue to interact at historical levels and corporations
find themselves intricately interwoven in the world without regard to geographic borders,
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international insolvency reform in the form of cooperative efforts will be the key to maintain
future global financial stability.
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